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Rules of Legal Ethics: The Drafting Task
By GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR.*
In the early part of 198o, the American Bar Association Com-
mission on Evaluation of Professional Standards published its
Discussion Draft of a revision of the rules of ethics governing the
American legal profession. The Commission is widely known as
the Kutak Commission, after the name of its chairman, Robert J.
Kutak, Esq., of Omaha, Nebraska. The Commission was created
with the announced purpose of considering whether a revision
of the rules of ethics was necessary. In fact, before the Commis-
sion's creation it was well recognized that a comprehensive re-
vision was needed. Hence, the principal task of the Commission
was to undertake the rewriting.
The Commission includes lawyers in practice, judges, legal
scholars, persons with extensive experience in government legal
service, and lay persons. Its membership is geographically diverse.
After having worked with the Commission for well over two
years, I can say that its members are unusual in their breadth of
vision, concern for the public good, ability to concentrate, and
willingness to listen. As a veteran of many drafting enterprises, I
have never worked with a more thoughtful deliberative body.
The Commission's product is formidable. The Discussion
Draft of the Model Rules is over ioo pages of concentrated text
and comment. A comprehensive revision of that Draft is now in
progress; it will come out in May or June and will probably be
shorter but more concentrated in text although longer in total by
reason of extensive annotations.
The Discussion Draft, as was intended, has been the subject of
intensive critical review by individual lawyers and bar associa-
* Professor of Law, Yale University; Reporter for American Bar Association Spe-
cial Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards. The first part of this
paper is based upon one given at the 198o joint meeting of the American and Aus-
tralian bars in Sydney, Australia. The paper expresses the views of the author,
which may not correspond to those of members of the Commission. The Commis-
sion's official view will be expressed in the revised Model Rules.
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tions for the last year. The revision will reflect that review. Every
section of the black letter and practically every paragraph of the
comment has been amended. The revision certainly will not
please everyone, although I believe it will meet most of the criti-
cisms. The Model Rules as proposed will be submitted to, and I
hope adopted by, the American Bar Association. If the ABA
adopts the Model Rules, they will be presented to authorities in
the states. In any case the Model Rules test the present Code and
various contempotary conceptions of legal ethics.
This paper explains the background of the proposed Rules of
Professional Conduct and analyzes the principal issues to which
they are responsive.
HISTORICAL BACKGRO UND
Control over admission to practice has been exercised by the
states since colonial times. Comprehensive state control over ad-
mission to practice was first asserted in the early nineteenth cen-
tury, primarily with the purpose of overthrowing the bar's
monopolistic system of apprenticeship. The power to admit a
lawyer to practice was vested in the courts, thereby conferring
ultimate authority over the profession in the judiciary as distinct
from the bar. The form of admission was the right of audience
before the state's courts. Admission to practice as an advocate
carries with it authority to counsel and assist clients in the pro-
fessional functions associated with the office lawyer.
This regulatory arrangement has had some lasting effects on
the governance of the American profession. The courts of the
nineteenth century were not much in the way of organized bu-
reaucracies. In fact, so far as the bar is concerned they had virtu-
ally no enforcement apparatus. Therefore, once a lawyer was
admitted to practice he could pretty well count on being left
alone. He needed to avoid gross impropriety toward a court,
which might excite the attention of the judges, and gross viola-
tion of etiquette in competition for clients, which would excite
the attention of fellow lawyers. Hence, under the nineteenth-
century judicial regime, for practical purposes the bar was subject
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to ethical supervision only in matters of forensic misconduct and
champerty in various forms, and even that supervision was ep-
isodic. There was no systematic development of norms of law
office practice.
There was another line of development in the law of profes-
sional conduct in the nineteenth century. This had to do with
the attorney-client privilege, that is, the rule that an attorney may
not give testimony about matters imparted to him in confidence
by a client. I have had occasion elsewhere to consider develop-
ment of this rule.' The rule is a vital element in the lawyer's pro-
fessional function, for the right to maintain client secrets is one of
the lawyer's most powerful professional instruments. However,
the evolution of the law of attorney-client privilege was peculiar.
Although the rule addressed activity occurring in the lawyer's
office- the receiving of confidences from a client-it was formu-
lated from the post hoc perspective of the courtroom. That is, the
rule had application only where a lawyer was called to testify
about the confidences already received concerning transactions
already completed. The courts hammered out the attorney-client
privilege rule and its exceptions with little or no systematic con-
cern for the relation of the rule to larger questions of professional
ethics. As expositors of the evidentiary law of attorney-client
privilege, the courts gave little systematic attention to the law-
yer's role, although that was a role which the courts, as gover-
nors of admission to practice and discipline of the bar, were
responsible for defining.
The nineteenth-century law of professional ethics, as it may be
called, therefore grew up around three principal problems. The
first was forensic misconduct, for example, offering perjured testi-
mony or behaving obstreperously toward a judge. The second
was intraprofessional competition-ambulance chasing, adver-
tising, and inveigling the clients of another lawyer. These two
problems were dealt with as a matter of bar discipline. The third
was the problem of preserving client confidences, which was the
subject of a branch of the law of evidence.
These nodal points were widely separated, both analytically
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and functionally. Moreover, even at these points legal develop-
ment was meager. Enforcement was sporadic; there was no real
government of the bar corresponding to the Law Society in Eng-
land; as doctrine in legal ethics emerged, it was not consolidated
into legislation, regulation, or accepted conventions. Such was
the state of the bar's regulation at the beginning of the nineteenth
century, and such its state remained until late in that century.
In the meantime the American legal profession had been rap-
idly expanding in numbers and function, paralleling the eco-
nomic development of the country. Judicial decision became an
important mechanism of lawmaking, and the function of advo-
cate became of corresponding political importance. In the realm
of economic development, the corporation became the primary
mechanism of capital formation and entrepreneurial effort, and
the corporate mortgage was perfected as an instrument of finance.
The function of legal draftsman became of corresponding eco-
nomic importance. 2 The United States was a swirl of change and
expansion; the lawyers were the go-betweens. From the perspec-
tive of modern times, we sometimes look back on this period with
rose-colored glasses, seeing it as the fulfillment in the young
country of the ancient traditions of a learned profession. In fact,
for the legal profession the nineteenth century seems to have
been a period of opportunity, opportunism, and chaos.
3
Concerned lawyers tried to bring forth order. The 183os and
184os witinessed the organization or revival of local bar associa-
tions in the United States. Several commentators made attempts
at systematic statements of the ethics of the profession, seeking
order by prescription. Of these, the best known in America are
Hoffman's ethical precepts, published in 1817, and Sharswood's
lectures, given in 1854.
Both Hoffman's precepts and Sharswood's lectures were ad-
dressed to the young lawyer. They were lofty in aspiration and
preachy in tone. They presumed the existence of a bar that was
economically secure, apolitical but part of the civil establishment,
and made up of high-minded gentlemen engaged in a learned
calling for which they might receive incidental honoraria. Hoff-
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man and Sharswood made much of questions of punctilio and
little of ethical dilemmas of real substance. This approach to the
difficult problems of professional ethics sought to surmount
rather than to confront them. While the bar was in a state of near
anarchy as far as professional function was concerned, the avail-
able ethical guidance consisted of Victorian moralizing at its
worst.
The ethical prescriptions propounded by Sharswood were a
major source for the Canons of Ethics adopted by the Alabama
Bar Association in 1887. The Alabama Canons in turn became
the basis of the Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the
American Bar Association in 19o8. 5 The 19o8 Canons remained
the American legal profession's statement of self-regulation until
1970. It is pertinent to observe, however, that the Canons were
not law. They did not take the form of law: their syntax was
exhortatory as often as it was obligatory and they made no pre-
tence at precision or completeness. They did not have the au-
thority of law, for they were not legislatively adopted as such and
were regarded by the courts as advisory at most. Furthermore,
they were not coordinated with the evolving law of the legal pro-
fession expounded by the courts.
THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
In 1965 the American Bar Association created a committee to
revise the Canons of Ethics. The product of that drafting effort
was the Code of Professional Responsibility of 1970.6 The Code
has since been adopted, sometimes with important amendments,
in virtually all states of the American union. It was in many re-
spects a major achievement.
First and foremost, the code transformed the legal character of
the rules of professional ethics by bringing them together into a
systematic text. There was considerable difficulty in doing this. It
is not easy, for example, to accommodate the hard law on such
matters as solicitation of clientele with preachments about service
to mankind. The Code sought to meet this difficulty by adopting
three sets of norms. First, there were "Canons"-very general
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principles, such as Canon 4 that "A Lawyer Should Preserve the
Confidences and Secrets of a Client." Second, subsumed under the
canons were "Disciplinary Rules"-legal regulations written in
black letter and backed by the sanctions of enforcement. Side by
side with these were "Ethical Considerations," statements some-
times consisting of explanations of the Disciplinary Rules and
sometimes consisting of exhortations and idealisms echoing the
Victorian antecedents. Many readers of the Code are still puzzled
by this juxtaposition. I suspect the Code's draftsmen were equally
puzzled.
Even with this anomalous three-level structure, however, the
Code had accomplished an important transition. Whatever might
be made of the Canons and Ethical Considerations, the Discipli-
nary Rules constituted a no-nonsense piece of legislation. Adop-
tion of such legislation meant that questions of legal ethics had
become questions of law.
Considered as a piece of legislation, however, the Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility left a great deal to be desired. It was
conservative in the negative sense of the word. For one thing, it
was anachronistic in its conception of the legal profession. The
Code visualized the profession as consisting essentially of prac-
titioners in independent private practice, even though at the time
about one-quarter of the members of the bar were employed by
government agencies or private organizations such as corpora-
tions. The Code visualized the private practitioner as engaged in
solo or small-firm practice, even though a high fraction of practi-
tioners were associated with large or medium-sized firms or with
law departments. The lawyer was visualized as typically acting as
advocate in court, even though most lawyers were primarily office
practitioners and many had not been inside a courtroom since the
day of their admission. The typical client was visualized as an
individual with an occasional legal problem, even though mod-
em practice had come to center on corporate clientele for which
lawyers serve on retainer. In short, as some critics have noted, the
Code conceived of the practice of law as it was in downstate I1-
linois-or upstate New York-in i86o.7
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The result of this set of factual premises about law practice was
that the Code ignored many important ethical problems in the
practice of law-for example, the peculiar problems presented
when the client is a corporate entity and not a flesh-and-blood in-
dividual; the variant forms of conflict of interest that arise when
the lawyer serves a function other than that of advocate; the re-
sponsibilty of a member of a law firm for the ethical behavior of
other associates in the firm. The Code was conservative, again in
the negative sense of the term, in another way. It undertook to
arrest an evolution in legal services that had begun in the 1950s
and was in full swing in the i96os. Broadly, the evolution con-
cerned provision of legal services to persons of modest means. The
direction of change was away from legal services on a fee basis to
individual clients, toward services on a prepaid basis to classes of
clients. One facet of the change was "activist advocacy," wherein
political and social groups took up causes for disadvantaged in-
dividuals. The prototype was civil rights litigation by the Na-
tional Association for the Advancement of Colored People, cul-
minating in Brown v. Board of Education. Another facet of the
change was the arrangement whereby unions provided lawyers
for their members in personal injury cases, aiming for better
services at lower cost. Another facet was the transformation of
legal aid into the Federal Legal Services Program, which now
provides legal services on a federal scale instead of by local hand-
out. Yet another was group legal services, organized like medical
insurance.
All these new legal services were in one stage or another of
development while the Code of Professional Responsibility was
being drafted.8 It seems fair to say that the Code draftsmen, re-
flecting preponderant sentiment in the bar at the time, were wary
of all and hostile to some of these developments. These new legal
services had in common that they involved nontraditional ways
for establishing contact between client and lawyer. The Code
draftsment therefore regarded them, at least prima facie, as new
forms of solicitation-ambulance chasing. This attitude was man-
ifested in the Code's controls on the procedures whereby legal
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services might be put at the disposal of clientele. About a third of
the black letter of the Code of Professional Responsibilty deals
with this problem, ironically under the rubric of Canon 2 which
provides that "A Lawyer Should Assist the Legal Profession in
Fufilling Its Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available." These un-
waveringly negative regulations were adopted in the face of Su-
preme Court decisions plainly indicating that access to legal
services is protected by the United States Constitution.9
The inability or unwillingness of the bar to foresee the trend
of the law governing lawyers has repeated itself recently in New
York. The Court of Appeals has unanimously adopted a position
concerning advertising that some members of the bar may think
is unthinkable. 10 Insensitivity to trends in the law used to be
merely antisocial. Persistent inability to accept what the law por-
tends in this respect, however, borders on if it does not consist of
antitrust liability and tortious interference with First Amend-
ment rights. It is time that lawyers and the organized bar came to
understand that they are governed by law, bound by law, and
answerable before the law, like other people.
As far as bar sentiment was concerned in 197o, however, the
Code had one clearly desirable attribute: it was not controversial.
Accordingly, the Code was quickly adopted not only by the Am-
erican Bar Association's House of Delegates but also by the sev-
eral states.
Although sharp criticism has been leveled at the code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility, here and elsewhere, I believe the Code
was a major advance. For one thing, a more foward-looking re-
vision probably could not have been enacted in 197o-not one of
the better years for political deliberation. Substantively, the Code
sorted out several ethical problems. It differentiated between is-
sues of professional conduct warranting serious legislative atten-
tion and those that are matters of etiquette or personal taste. The
Code recognized the new forms of legal services, even if it did so
grudgingly. The Code adopted a large number of very sensible
rules that will stand for some time to come. Finally, because it
undertook to be serious legislation, the Code made a contribution
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to reconsideration of the ethics of the profession. Before the adop-
tion of the Code of Professional Responsibility, legal ethics was
disparaged by legal intellectuals and given lip service by most
practitioners. Since then, legal ethics has become very serious
legal topic.
Nevertheless, the deficiencies in the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility are now substantial. The ethical problems of the law-
yer for the corporation have become too manifest to be resolved
by a merely exhortative proposition that the "client is the entity."
Conflict-of-interest problems have become too complicated to be
handled under a single rubric. And so on. There is no real dis-
agreement on this point. Even the most choleric critics of the
Discussion Draft of the Model Rules acknowledge that the Code
needs major rewriting. They argue, however, that it should take
the form of revision of the Code and not a new format. There is
something to be said for this viewpoint and it is possible to work
the substance of the Model Rules into the form of the Code. In-
deed, the Kutak Commission plans a format doing just that.
However, it is essential to face the difficulties in moving in that
direction.
THE TRIPARTITE DIVISION
Serious defects in the present Code derive from its three-level
set of norms-the "axiomatic" Canons, the Ethical Considera-
tion, and the Disciplinary Rules. But the apparent virtue of this
format should be acknowledged, for many lawyers find comfort
in it: The Canons and Ethical Considerations contain the lofty
pronouncements of the 19o8 Canons, while not going so far as to
convert these sentiments into real legal obligations.
Illustrative of this rhetorical virtue is the treatment of adver-
tising. Canon 2 says that "A Lawyer Should Assist the Legal Pro-
fession in Fulfilling Its Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available,"
and Ethical Consideration EC2-1 says that "the need of members
of the public for legal services is met only if they recognize their
legal problems, appreciate the importance of seeking assistance,
and are able to obtain the services of acceptable legal counsel."
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These passages offer reassurance that the legal profession ac-
knowledges its public trust to provide all who need it with legal
assistance. At the same time, the Disciplinary Rules prevent in-
dividual lawyers from being any more assertive in telling laymen
about their legal rights than the courts require under the First
Amendment. These Rules in effect protect established elements
of the profession from the competition of legal services based on
advertising, even though advertising is probably the most effi-
cient way of making legal counsel more widely available.
There is a similar split vision in the Code regarding certain as-
pects of conflicts of interest. Canon 5 says that "A Lawyer Should
Exercise Independent Professional Judgment on Behalf of a
Client." Ethical Consideration EC 5-1 says that "The profes-
sional judgment should be exercised ... solely for the benefit of
his client and free from compromising influences and loyalties."
These propositions are merely aspirational, however. Discipli-
nary Rule DR 5-1o 4 (A), governing the inherently conflicted
matter of business deals between client and lawyer, is much more
narrowly drawn. It says that "A lawyer shall not enter into a busi-
ness transaction with a client if they have differing interests
therein and if the client expects the lawyer to exercise his pro-
fessional judgment therein for the protection of the client, unless
the client has consented after full disclosure." This Rule is full
of loopholes. To begin with, the Rule does not acknowledge that
if the transaction is between "client" and "lawyer," it is between
them in their roles as such, and not as autonomous strangers. A
transaction between a client and lawyer as such involves neces-
sarily, and not merely contingently, some element of "profes-
sional judgment for the protection of the client." The Rule thus
implicitly allows business deals between client and lawyer even
where the client relies on the lawyer's professional judgment in
the transaction. Having done this, the Rule requires as protection
for the client only that there be "disclosure" and "consent"; it
does not require that the deal meet the standard of objective fair-
ness which the law generally requires in transactions between
persons in a confidential relationship. In schizophrenic fashion
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Canon 5, EC 5-1, and DR 5 -1o 4 (A) taken together assert a noble
fiduciary principle but leave largely untrammelled the lawyer's
opportunity to engage in free trade with a client.
In this same vein we may consider the Code's treatment of the
delicate matter of drafting a will containing donative provisions
benefiting the draftsman. Ethical Consideration EC 5-5 says that
"If a client voluntarily offers to make a gift to his lawyer, the
lawyer may accept the gift, but before doing so, he should urge
that his client secure disinterested advice from an independent,
competent person who is cognizant of all the circumstances."
Even this Ethical Consideration does not quite say that the donor
should obtain independent legal advice. It also does not say that
the advice should be obtained before the donor provides for the
gift, but only that the advice be obtained before the lawyer ac-
cepts the gift. How can that be done when the donor is now dead?
In any case EC 5-5 is merely an ethical consideration. The Dis-
ciplinary Rules are silent on the subject of donative provisions
benefiting the lawyer. That pregnant silence impliedly make it
legitimate for a lawyer to draft a will providing him with a testa-
mentary gift-a transaction the law recognizes as suspect and
which most laymen probably regard as lawyer avarice in its pur-
est form. But under the Disciplinary Rules such a transaction is
entirely compatible with exercise of independent professional
judgment on behalf of a client.
Other illustrations can be provided of similar ways in which
the Canons and Ethical Considerations move in opposite direc-
tions from the Disciplinary Rules. The Canons and Ethical Con-
siderations posit a high degree of professional punctillio and an
integrity befitting an honorable profession. But the Disciplinary
Rules refuse to deliver when it gets down to cases. The profession
has thus writ for itself a document that gives in the big print and
takes away in the small, except that the Code gives in the italics
and takes away in the black letter.
The consequence is not simply dissonance as between preten-
sion and performance. The Code manifests, reflects cynicism or
innocence as to the nature of legal rules. The theory of the Code
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is that the Canons provide a general framework, the Discipli-
nary Rules provide a legal floor, and the Ethical Considerations
provide a higher plateau to which lawyers may aspire but which
they are not legally obliged to reach. As already suggested, this
structure is inherently ambiguous in that it pretends professional
responsibilities that are not delivered. But the three-level system
has even more insidious effects on the meaning of the black-letter
Disciplinary Rules.
Simply put, the Canons and Ethical Considerations narrow the
meaning of the black-letter Disciplinary Rules. They do this by
preempting any extensive interpretation that the Disciplinary
Rules might be given in penumbral areas around the black-letter.
This effect requires explanation through examples.
To return to DR 5-1o 4 (A), the Disciplinary Rule states that a
lawyer shall not enter a business transaction with a client if they
have "differing interests" unless there is "full disclosure" by the
lawyer. This rule could fairly be read to mean that "full disclos-
ure" requires the lawyer to analyze the deal critically from the
client's perspective, and enter the deal only after such devil's ad-
vocacy. On that reading, DR 5-1o 4(A) would comport with gen-
eral principles governing transactions involving a fiduciary. How-
ever, the Ethical Considerations implicitly preclude such a read-
ing of DR 5-1o 4 (A). Alongside DR 5-1o 4 (A), and speaking to
the same subject, is Ethical Consideration EC 5-3, which says: "A
lawyer shall not seek to persuade his client to permit him to invest
in an undertaking of his client...." If DR 5-1o 4 (A) and EC 5-3
are read together, under the principle of expresio unius it fol-
lows that a lawyer's "seeking to persuade" a client to cut him in
on a deal is not incompatible with "full disclosure." Thus, DR
5-1o 4 (A) when read alone might be reasonably interpreted to
mean that a lawyer's use of "persuasion" on a client regarding a
business deal between them is incompatible with the lawyer's ex-
ercising "professional judgment . . . solely for the benefit of the
client." But when DR 5-1o4(A) is read along with Ethical Con-
sideration EC 5-3, it follows that a lawyer can use such persuasion
without violating the Rules. Anyone who is even mildly skeptical
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about the efficacy of "full disclosure" in such a situation will
wonder whether DR 5-1o4(A), as a practical matter, prohibits
anything except fraud.
There are many other such situations under the Code. Two
further examples may suffice. The first concerns the duty of dili-
gence on behalf of the client. Canon 7 says "A Lawyer Should
Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law."
Ethical Consideration EC 7-8 refers to "best efforts" for the cli-
ent and EC 7-9 refers to "best interests" of the client. However,
the Disciplinary Rule, DR 7 -1o(A)(1) says that "a lawyer shall
not intentionally fail to seek the lawful objectives of his client."
The standard set by this Rule is not that of reasonable care or
even minimal care, but only avoidance of intentional nonfeas-
ance. This construction is reinforced by the reference in the Can-
ons and Ethical Considerations to "zeal" and "best efforts,"
which by necessary implication are measures of effort not re-
quired by DR 7-101 (A)(i).
A second example is the problem of conflict of interest with a
former client. The Code's only black-letter provisions on a law-
yer's responsibility to a former private client are that the lawyer
refund any unearned fee and turn the client's papers over to suc-
cessor counsel, see DR 2-1 io(A), and that the lawyer not "know-
ingly" use a client's confidence to the disadvantage of the client,
see DR 4-101 (B). Canon 4 says that "A Lawyer Should Preserve
the Confidences and Secrets of a Client," which could be con-
strued to refer to confidences of former clients. However, such a
construction of the Canon by implication reinforces the interpre-
tation that Rule DR 4- 1 l(B) applies only to a person who has
the status of client at the time the information in question is
used. That interpretation excludes former clients.
In the tripartite division of the Code, the Canons and Ethical
Considerations were supposed to be a higher normative level
built upon the Disciplinary Rules as a firm legal foundation. On
the contrary, they do not turn out that way. The Canons and Eth-
ical Considerations by implication depress the Rules to the low-
est level of meaning that their literal words admit. That is not
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law, but less than law-legal rules with anti-contextual provisions
and counter-commentary.
In some instances, this gap between the aspirational norms and
the black letter Rules is so great that the courts have simply ig-
nored the Rules. The best illustration concerns the matter of
representation adverse to the former client, just referred to. The
Disciplinary Rules only prohibit "knowingly" using confidences
to the former client's disadvantage. Canon 9, however, says that
"A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Impropriety."
The courts have simply treated Canon 9 as a Rule.'"
Thus under the Code, for any given ethical situation, there are
three possible legal rules: the black letter Rules read normally as
a statute; the black letter Rules read hyper-narrowly in light of
what the Canons and Ethical Considerations say the Rules do
not mean; and the Canons or Ethical Considerations read as rules
that supplement or displace the Disciplinary Rules.
PROFESSIONAL RULES AS A PENAL CODE
The Code is written as a penal code, and this is a mistake.
In the scheme of the Code, the Disciplinary Rules really mean
business, i.e., enforcement is contemplated. Hence, the black let-
ter provisions were called Disciplinary Rules. In this conception,
a rule whose enforcement could not be contemplated is not a
rule, and therefore must be only an Ethical Consideration or a
Canon. All Rules in the Code therefore are in the form of pro-
hibitions, like a penal code.
This approach overlooks the fact that real legal rules include
ones that are not prohibitory. Indeed, many very important legal
rules are not prohibitory, but rather are constitutive-"organic"
or "empowering." Such rules prescribe ways in which public au-
thority and private endeavors may validly be organized and con-
ducted. For example, the rules of the United States Constitution,
the New York Corporation Law, and the Uniform Commercial
Code are mostly constitutive.
Much relevant law governing the legal profession is similarly
constitutive. The rules governing admission to the bar are con-
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stitutive, for they prescribe the terms under which a person can
validly act as a lawyer. The rules allowing a lawyer to appear in
court on behalf of a client are likewise constitutive. And so on.
Directly to the point of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
many of the rules governing the client-lawyer relationship are
constitutive. For example, it is because a lawyer is constituted an
officer of the court that the lawyer is authorized to receive confi-
dential communications from the client. From that situation fol-
lows the lawyer's obligation to maintain confidentiality of the
matters communicated. The prohibition on disclosure of confi-
dences, which of course is a penal provision, is unintelligible un-
less the lawyer's role as an advocate or counsellor is first legally
posited.
The relevance of this point to the Code is this: Some rules-
"real" rules-governing the lawyer's role are more coherently
stated in constitutive form than in the form of prohibitions that
presuppose the constitutive predicate. For example, case law on
the lawyer's role recognizes that the lawyer has broad ranges of
professional discretion. One such area is the lawyer's authority to
grant extensions of time, overlook minor defaults, etc., with re-
gard to an opposing party, even if the client wants to be vindic-
tively technical. The most direct way of recognizing this authority
is to state that a lawyer has discretion as to the means employed
in representing a client, or words to that effect. The Code is un-
able to do this directly, however, because it allows itself to speak
only in prohibitions. The result, in DR 7-101, is as follows:
"(A) A lawyer shall not intentionally . . . (i) Fail to seek
the lawful objectives of his client.., except as provided by
DR 7-101 (B). A lawyer does not violate this Disciplinary
Rule, however, by acceding to reasonable requests of op-
posing counsel.... etc."
"(B) In his representation of a client, a lawyer may... (i)
Where permissible, exercise his professional judgment to
waive or fail to assert a right or position of his client."
The key point is the lawyer's professional discretion. How-
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ever, the point is buried as an exception to a prohibition against
failing to serve the client. Even in this subordinate position the
discretion is defined in empty terms of "where permissible." No-
where does the Code indicate what is permissible." This may
have been an oversight, or the result of reluctance to undertake a
definition. However, it seems equally plausible that professional
discretion was not defined because the Code's rule-making ma-
terial-Disciplinary Rules-cannot speak in constitutive terms, or
at best can do so awkwardly.
The preoccupation with prohibitions seems to have affected the
substance of the Code in subtler ways. For example, with regard
to fees, the general principle governing professional fees is that
the fee be reasonable. This can be simply stated in affirmative
terms that a fee "shall be reasonable." In the Code, DR 2-1o6(B),
this requirement is transformed into a prohibition against a fee
"in excess of a reasonable fee." Such a formulation shifts orienta-
tion from the center of the fee range, cannoted by the term "rea-
sonable," to the upper boundary of the fee range where "excess"
begins. The ground upon which a client can complain about a
fee is correspondingly narrowed. There are other illustrations of
this tendency.
INCOHERENCE OF ARRANGEMENT
The topical arrangement of Disciplinary Rules in the Code is
chaotic. This probably resulted from the tripartite system of
norms, wherein a Rule had to be subsumed under one of the nine
Canons even if it involved more than one normative principle.
Whatever the cause, the consequence is plain.
For examples, harrassing an opposing party is dealt with in
DR 2-1o 9 (A), DR 2-1 o(B), and DR 7-102(A); neglecting a cli-
ent matter is dealt with in DR 6-1oi(A) and DR 7-1o1(A); with-
drawal from representation is dealt with in DR 2-1 1o, DR 5-102,
and DR 5-1o5; conflicts of interest are dealt with in DR 5-1o
through 5-107, 6-io2, 8-ioi and 9-ilo; payments to a retired
member of a law firm are dealt with in DR 2-1o8(A) and DR 3-
ioi(A)(3); fees are dealt with in DR 2-1o6, 2-107, and 5-1o3.
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Looking at the organization of the Code in another way, the Dis-
ciplinary Rules grouped under Canon 2 deal with advertising,
solicitation, division of fees among lawyers, agreeing in a settle-
ment not to be involved in similar cases, and withdrawal from
representation; those grouped under Canon 5 regulate advance-
ment of litigation expenses as well as conflicts of interest; and
those under Canon 7 regulate neglect of a client, harrassment of
other persons, client perjury, disclosure of client fraud, observ-
ance of local customs of the bar, and trial publicity. Then again,
DR 1-102(A)(l) and (3) provide that a lawyer shall not "violate
a Disciplinary Rule" or "engage in illegal conduct involving
moral turpitude," while DR 7-102(A)(8) provides that a lawyer
shall not "knowingly engage in other illegal conduct or conduct
contrary to a Disciplinary Rule."
THE CENTRAL ISSUES
The Kutak Commission's rejection of the Code format did not
emanate from a preference for novelty. It resulted from a quest
for coherence. That quest began with consideraton of basic ethi-
cal issues that arise in the practice of law. I believe coherent rules
of professional conduct can be forthcoming only with such an
orientation.
The beginning point for the Kutak Commission has been that
adversarial representation of clients is in the public interest. This
proposition is not self-evident, or even demonstrable. The ad-
versary system as we know is regarded by many civilizations to be
barbaric. Many thoughtful business, religious, and other lay
leaders in our own national community hold the same belief, as
can be discovered by examining public sentiment about lawyers.
Moreover, there is no proof that the adversary system of trial
yields truth more often than other systems of trial; that, too, is an
article of faith, because there is no way to conduct a reliable ex-
periment. The system of adversarial representation indeed is
probably better justified as an institution for safeguarding lib-
erty and privacy than for eliciting truth. Whatever the justifica-
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tion for the system, however, the premise is one accepted by vir-
tually all lawyers, including those on the Kutak Commission.
From the premise of adversarial representation, two general
propositions derive. The first is that of confidentiality-that in-
formation concerning a client should be kept secret. The second
is that of loyalty to client-the lawyer should act in the client's
interest. I believe it will be discovered that the forthcoming re-
vision of the Model Rules has broader and more definite state-
ments of these general propositions than in either the Discipli-
nary Rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility or the
19o8 Canons. The general propositions concerning confidential-
ity and loyalty are not really difficult to formulate. For that reason
little is gained by repeatedly reiterating them, or reiterating the
essential virtue of the adversary system.
Unfortunately, most of the comments addressed to the Discus-
sion Draft have begun and ended with such exhortations. What
is needed is not exhortation but analysis, particularly analysis
that focuses on formulation of the exceptions to the general prin-
ciples of confidentiality and loyalty. Such a focus is required not
because commitment to the general principles is equivocal, but
because that commitment is not unqualified. No responsible
commentator-as far as I know, no one at all-has proposed un-
qualified rules of confidentiality and loyalty. The problem is how
to draft the qualifications.
In my judgment the proper drafting approach is to think of
concrete cases, and to ask where and in what terms to draw lines
among them. In the Kutak Commission we have done that
through the laborious means of drafting and redrafting. It does
not seem to be generally understood that the draft leaked in Au-
gust, 1979, and the draft released in January, 198o, were part of
the drafting effort and not end product. The Commission's end
product is-not due until May or June. At this point it is sufficient
to array the tough cases and to invite general deliberation about
them.
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The tough cases can be put in four groups:
1. Exceptions to confidentiality.
Is a lawyer (permitted) (required) to disclose information
about a client when the client:
a) Seems (clearly) (possibly) bent on (homicide) (serious bodily
injury to another) (fraud) (legally wrongful destruction of prop-
erty) (any crime) (intentional act violating the legal rights of
another)?
b) Has committed a (crime) (fraud) (intentional act violating
the legal rights of another) that has resulted in serious injury, the
reparation of which could be aided by the disclosure? What if the
client used the lawyer's services to commit the act?
c) Accuses the lawyer of a legally wrongful act, or refuses to
exonerate the lawyer where both of them are accused of a wrong-
ful act?
d) Gives testimony that the lawyer (strongly suspects) (reason-
ably believes) (knows) is (erroneous) (perjurious)? Does it make
a difference if the client is an accused in a criminal case?
2. Limits on assistance to a client.
May a lawyer:
a) Advise a client how to commit a (serious crime) (crime)
(fraud) (intentional tort) (breach of contract)? Advise the client
of the likelihood of getting caught in such conduct under various
circumstances?
b) Prepare documents or other means that the client (intends
to) (probably will) (might) use to commit a legal wrong on an-
other? That (may) (are likely to) result in (avoidance) (possibly
illegal avoidance) (evasion) of taxes or governmental regulation?
c) Volunteer an admonition to a client when he (knows) (sus-
pqcts) the client is bent on commiting (crime) (fraud) (intentional
legal wrong) that is likely to have (serious) consequences to
another?
3. Loyalty to organization client.
When a lawyer represents a corporation, government agency
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or other organization, what should the lawyer do when he or she
(knows) (reasonably should know) (reasonably suspects) that:
a) A lower level employee is engaged in (fraud against) (self-
dealing against the interest of) the client? (Has filed) (Is about to
file) a false tax or regulatory return on behalf of the client? (Is
engaged) (Is about to engage in) illegal price-fixing, or a swindle
of third parties?
b) What if the person involved in the foregoing is a high level
employee?
c) What if the board or governing committee is involved?
d) In exploring any such problem with an employee or board
member who (is) (might be) involved, is the lawyer (required)
(permitted) to give that individual a "Miranda warning" to the
effect that the client is the organization and not the individual?
4. Clients with conflicting interests.
May a lawyer (upon disclosure to all concerned) (where it is
in their best interest) (otherwise) represent both parties to a
proposed:
a) Purchase of realty as tenants in common?
b) Formation of a business partnership or closely held
corporation?
c) Sale and purchase of realty? Also the mortgage?
d) Antenuptual agreement?
e) Dissolution of a business partnership or closely held
corporation?
f) Division in kind of the assets of an estate among
distributees?
g) Property settlement between spouses in (friendly)
(not embittered) contemplation of separation or divorce?
Child custody agreement?
One has to work out answers to these and related questions in
order to draft rules of professional conduct, or for that matter
seriously to analyze the present Code. In May or June the Kutak
Commission will have done its best in that task. I hope its answers
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will be accepted, although they will no doubt be rejected by some
members of the bar. But the questions will not go away.
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